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1. Introduction. 
Inappropriate use of Dempster's rule of 
combination has led some authors to reject 
the Dempster-Shafer model, arguing that it 
leads to supposedly unacceptable 
conclusions when default is involved. The 
most classic example is that of the penguin 
Tweety. This paper will successively 
present: 
1 .  the origin of the miss-management of 
the Tweety example; 
2. the two types of default; 
3. the correct solution for both types 
based on the transferable belief model 
(our interpretation of the Dempster­
Shafer model (Shafer 1976, Smets 
1988)); 
Except when explicitly stated, all belief 
functions used in this paper are simple 
support functions, i.e. belief functions for 
which only one proposition (the focus) of 
the frame of discernment receives a positive 
basic belief mass with the remaining mass 
being given to the tautology. Each belief 
function will be described by its focus and 
the weight of the focus (e.g. m(A)=.9). 
Computation of the basic belief masses are 
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always performed by vacuously extending 
each belief function to the product space 
b uilt from all variables involved, 
combining them on that space by 
Dempster's rule of combination, and 
projecting the result to the space 
corresponding to each individual variable. 
2. The Miss-Managment of Tweety 
Users of Dempster-Shafer theory have 
sometimes treated the Tweety example as 
follows: 
- they create three propositional primitives 
B, P and F (for Bird, Penguin and Fly). 
- they create the implication B::>F ("if bird 
then fly"). 
Of course the aim of this implication 
formula is to translate the assertion 
"generally birds fly", "typically birds fly", 
"usually birds fly", "most birds fly" .. .into 
the belief function framework. To cope 
with these fine shades of meaning, one 
gives a less than one basic belief mass (e.g. 
.9) to the material implication B::>F, i.e. 
m ( B ::>F) = . 9. When one learns tl:iat 
Tweety is a bird, another belief function 
m(B)=l is added and the system deduces 
the combined belief m(F)=.9. 
Then one learns that Tweety is in fact a 
penguin. Penguins are birds, so one 
introduces the belief m(P::> B)= 1. As 
usually penguins do not fly, one also 
introduces the belief m(P=>�)=.95. After 
introducing a fourth belief function 
m(P)=l, two belief functions are induced 
on F, one derived from the birdness of 
Tweety (m(F)=.9) and the other derived 
from the penguinness of Tweety 
(m(-,F)=.95). By Dempster's rule of 
combination, one obtains the overall belief 
function with m(F) = .31, m(�) = .66 
and m(Fv� = .03. 
Of course the expected solution is m( -,F) = 
.95 and m(Fv....,P) = .05 as Tweety is a 
penguin and the belief that Tweety flies 
given it is a penguin is .95. The origin of 
the error results from the non-applicability 
of Dempster's rule of combination. Indeed 
this rule can only be applied when the two 
pieces of evidence that induce the two 
belief functions m 1 (B:::>F) and m2(P:::>...,P) 
are distinct 
In the present case, distinctness is not 
satisfied, because birds and penguins are 
related: birds are either penguin-birds (P) 
or non-penguin-birds (NPB): B = PvNPB. 
Hence bel(FIB) = bel(FIPvNPB), so 
bel(FIB) results from the disjunctive 
combination of two belief functions -
bel(FIP) and bel(FINPB) - induced by the 
two distinct pieces of evidence (P and 
NPB). Remember that Dempster's rule of 
combination concerns the conjunctive 
combination of two belief functions 
induced by the two distinct pieces of 
evidence as in: 
bel (FIX& Y) = bel(FlX)EBbel(FlY) 
In the present case, we are facing the 
problem of disjunctive combination of 
distinct pieces of evidence. We have shown 
in Smets (1978) that if P and NPB are two 
distinct pieces of evidence concerning our 
belief about F then 
bel(FIB) = bel(FIPvNPB) 
= bel(FIP).bel(FlNPB) 
Even when this rule does not apply, 
bel(FIB) is somehow related to bel(FIP). 
Hence Dempster's rule of combination is 
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not applicable in the above example, as the 
two pieces of evidence B and P are not 
distinct. We develop a more correct 
analysis below. 
3. Two types of default. 
A default may be written as A:B/C (Reiter 
1980) where A, B and C are formulae. It is 
read "if A is true and B is consistent, then 
C is true". A is the prerequisite, B is the 
justification and C is the consequence of 
the default (Besnard 1989). A normal 
default (A:B/B) is a default in which the 
justification and the consequence are the 
same. It could also be written as 
A:A:::>B/A:::>B. Both forms of default yield 
the same results, while normal defaults 
without prerequisite :A:::>B/A:::::>B give 
different results. A:B/B is called a standard 
normal default (Touretzky 1984), whereas 
:A:::>B/A:::>B is called a normal default 
without prerequisite (Poole 1985). The 
question as to which of the two types of 
default is appropriate depends, in fact, on 
the context The difference between the two 
types of default can be seen in the case of 
modus tollens and case reasoning (Besnard 
1989). 
- With :A:::>B/A:::>B, modus tollens is 
applicable. From -,B, one deduces -,A 
if the default can be applied. It is not the 
case with A:B/B. 
- With :A:::>X/A:::>X and :B:::>X/B:::>X 
one infers X from A v B. It is not the 
case with A:X/X and B:X/X. 
Some authors feel that modus tollens 
should be avoided as in the following 
example: if a person is kind, then he is 
popular and if a person is fat, then he is not 
popular. If John is fat, he is indeed not 
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popular. But one would like to avoid the 
inference that John is not kind. Hence 
standard default should be used in this 
case. S ometimes default without 
prerequisite seems to be more appropriate, 
as in the following case: birds fly, bats fly, 
coco is either a bird or a bat, hence coco 
flies. The question as to which default is 
more appropriate is not discussed here. We 
only show how both types of default may 
be represented using belief functions. 
4. Normal Defaults without 
Prerequisites ( :B::::>F/B::::>F). 
Normal Defaults without Prerequisites is 
solved by the introduction of an auxiliary 
variable (as is done in McCarthy's anomaly 
theory). Let B, P and F represent Bird, 
Penguin and Fly respectively. We 
introduce the auxiliary binary variable TB 
which represents the concept of Typical­
Bird. The default :B::::> F / B  ::::> F is 
represented by B&TB::::>F. The network in 
Figure 1 is the screen dump extracted from 
MacEvidence (Hsia and Shenoy 1989).  In 
the inner rectangular area, there are three 
nodes B, TB and F and a link among them. 
This links represents our belief on the joint 
BxTB:xF space. It is characterized here by 
the simple support function m(B&TB::::>F) 
= 1. Furthermore, the fact that things are 
usually typical (in this case birds are 
usually typical) is encoded by the belief 
m(TB) = .9 (fed into MacEvidence through 
the pTB box). 
Suppose we learn that Tweety is a bird. So 
we put m(B) = 1, and the system deduces 
m(F) = .9. Then we learn about penguin P. 
We must create new nodes and links that 
represent the new pieces of information we 
have about penguin (see the rectangular 
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area in the centre of Figure 1) . A penguin is 
a bird: m(P::::>B)=1. It is an atypical bird: 
m(P::hTB)= l .  Let us accept that "usually 
penguins do not fly" (for the sake of 
generality, we assume the existence of 
SuperPenguin which flies) , so 
m(P&TP::::>�=1 and m(TP)=.95, where 
TP means Typical-Penguin and the 
"usuallity" level is quantified by .95. Since 
Tweety is a penguin, we put m(P)= 1. The 
system deduces m(B)=1 and m(--,F)=.95 
as required. The inference from B to F is 
blocked, because TB is no longer true 
(m(--,TB)=1) 
Later, we learn that Tweety is 
SuperPenguin, and we add a new layer 
(outer rectangular area in Figure 1) with 
variable S (SuperPenguin), TS (Typical­
SuperPenguin) and links m(S::::>P) = 1, 
m(S::::>--,TP) = 1, m(S&TS::::>F) = 1 and 
m(TS)= .99 (since a SuperPenguin may 
have a broken wing). Table 1 summarizes 
some of the results one could derive 
according to which variables are 
instantiated (by giving a belief 1 in the 
variables). 
As can be seen from Table 1, many back 
propagations occur. This is due to the fact 
that the prior beliefs about typicalities are 
fixed and cannot be modified. In the first 
line of Table 1, the m(....,P)=.9 corresponds 
to the fact that usually birds are typical, 
hence by the link P::::>--,TB, one gets the 
back propagation of .9 from --,TB to ....,P (a 
result that might justify the rejection of this 
formulation). A nice result is that the truth 
of B (second line) does not modify our 
belief in P. The modus tollens is observed 
(the ftfth line where -,F is true). -,F leads 
to -.B. The modus tollens also explains the 
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..,s (i.e. it it is not SuperPenguin). Our belief in P remains unchanged. 
Figure 1: Analysis of the Tweety example with normal defaults without prerequisites. 
Oval nodes represent variables, six-sided polygons represent links (characterized by logical 
constraints). 
B p s F 
? ? ..,p .9 ..,s .995 ? 
B B 1. ..,p .9 ..,s .995 F .9 
p B 1. p 1. ..,s .95 ..,p .95 
s B 1. p 1. s 1. F .99 
..,p -,B .9 ..,p .9 ..,s 1. ..,p 1. 
B F B 1. ..,p .995 ..,s .995 F 1. 
B..,P B 1. ? ..,s .999 ..,p 1. 
p F B 1. p 1. ? F 1. 
B..,P B 1. ..,p 1. ..,s 1. F .9 
Table 1: Normal defaults without prerequisites. Content of this table describes the simple 
support functions induced on propositions B, P, S and F according to the instantiated 
variables (left column). Each pair corresponds to the focus and its weight. '?' represents the 
vacuous belief function. 
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The three rectangular areas in Figure 1 
demonstrate the modular nature of our 
constructions.That is, whenever a new 
concept is introduced, previous variables 
and beliefs are kept unmodified; only new 
variables and new beliefs are added. 
5. Standard Normal Defaults 
(B :F/F) 
We now introduce the binary variables InB 
("I learn that it is a bird"), TB (Typical­
Bird), B (Bird) and F (Fly). When InB is 
instantiated (m(lnB)=l), we deduce that it 
is indeed a bird (m(lnB::>B)=l) and it is 
"p r o b a b l y "  a t y p i c a l  b i r d  
(m(InB::>TB)=.9). W e  know that typical 
bird flies (m(B&TB::>F)=l). The inner box 
of Figure 2 presents this model. After 
instantiating InB (m(lnB)=l), we get 
m(B)=l, m(TB)=.9 and m(F)=.9. To 
know whether it is a bird, we check 
variable B (not InB, as the latter represents 
the learning of the fact that it is a bird). To 
show the difference between B and InB, 
suppose you are worried about the fact that 
birds lay eggs. So we create the variable 
"Eggs" and the link m(B::>Eggs)=l. (and 
of course not m(lnB::>Eggs)=l: we don't 
get eggs because we learn that it is· a bird; 
rather we get eggs because it is a bird). 
Modus tollens is blocked in this formalism 
as m(-.F)=l induces m(Bv -. B  ) =  1, 
m(TBv-.TB)=l and m(-.lnB)=.9. So one 
does not get any belief in -.B from -.F. 
The general interpretation of the diagram 
presented in Figure 2 is: if you tell me that · 
Tweety is a bird, I will conclude that it is a 
bird and probably a typical (.9) bird. I 
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know that typical birds fly. So I believe at 
level .9 that Tweety flies. 
Next, we introduce the concept of penguin 
(middle box in Figure 2). So we introduce 
the variables InP ("I learn that it is a 
penguin"), TP (Typical-Penguin as far as 
flying is concerned), XP (an auxiliary 
variable used to stop back propagation of 
TB to -,P), and P (Penguin). The 
constraints are m(lnP::> TP) = .95, 
m(InP::>P) = 1, m(InP::>XP) = 1, m(P::>B) 
= I, m(P&XP::> -,TB) = 1 and 
m(P&TP::>-.F) = I. Instantiating InP by 
m(lnP)=l, we get m(-, F)=.95, m(B)=1 
(even if m(lnB)=1 had been instantiated). 
When SuperPenguin is introduced, we 
create nodes and links in a way that is 
similar to what we did for Penguin. 
However, we also create S&XS::>XP. It is 
needed in order to block a belief in TB 
when InB is instantiated. InS instantiates 
S, hence P by the link S::> S. But the 
variable XP must also be instantiated to 
block the relation B to F at TB through the 
link P&XJ>:>, TB. 
Table 2 summarizes some of the results one 
could derive according to which variables 
are instantiated after the introduction of 
SuperPenguin (which may have a broken 
wing). Note the difference between the 
ninth and tenth lines of Table 2. In the case 
of lnB and -.P, (i.e. we learn that Tweety is 
a bird and we know that Tweety is not a 
penguin), no back propagation occurs. 
Also note that both InB and InB&-.P lead 
to m(F) = .9. That is, -.P does not modify 
our belief about F once B is learned. This 
would not have been the case if we had 
specified the rule that the only non typical 
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B p s F 
? ? ? ? ? 
InB B 1. ? ? F .9 
InP B 1. p 1. ? ...,p .95 
InS B 1. p 1. s 1. F .99 
...,p ? ? ? ...,p 1. 
InB F B 1. ? ? F 1. 
lnB ...,p B 1. ? ? ...,p 1. 
InP F B 1. p 1. ? F 1. 
InB ...,p B 1. ...,p 1. ...,s 1. F .9 
InB InP B 1. p 1. ? ...,p .95 
InB InS B 1. p 1. s 1. F .99 
Table 2: Standard normal defaults. Content of this table describes the simple support functions 
induced on propositions B, P, S and F according to the instantiated variables (left hand 
column). Each pair corresponds to the focus and its weight. '?'represents the vacuous belief 
function. 
�----�CID �--� 
Figure 2: Analysis of the Tweety example with standard normal defaults. Oval nodes represent 
variables. Six-sided polygons represent links: those that include a number are weighted links (i.e. 
the implication receives the weight indicated), the others are logical links. Grey boxes are 
instantiating nodes (i.e. nodes through which the beliefs given to the variables can be initiated). 
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Figure 3: Clyde example. 
birds are the penguins (by adding 
m(-.TB::::>P)=l)). In fact, if we had added 
m(-.TB::::>P)=l, InB&...,P would have led 
to m(F)=l (i.e. we know that it is a bird 
and that it is not a penguin; hence it is a 
typical bird, and therefore it certainly flies, 
as the only exception is now impossible). 
The network in Figure 2 is cumbersome, 
but an auxiliary variable must be created 
each time we w ant to introduce a 
'unidirectional implication', i.e. a rule that 
will propagate beliefs in one direction only. 
Should bidirectional propagations be 
acceptable, many auxiliary variables and 
links can be removed (the resulting 
network would then resemble Figure 1). 
That is, if we accept that the instantiation 
m(lnB)=l leads to m(...,P)=l, etc, then the 
Circue-Elephants are 
Royal-Elephants 
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network becomes much simpler. We 
developed our formulation in order to show 
that it is possible to block all undesirable 
modus tollens. For instance, InB induces a 
belief in TB but leaves a vacuous belief on 
P, even though "usually P::::>..., T B " . 
Furthermore when both InB and InP (or 
InS) are instantiated, the flieness of Tweety 
is related only to its P (or S) status. 
Therefore our formulation satisfies the 
"preference by specificity" requirement 
(Moinard 1990). 
6. Clyde Greyness. 
As further illustration of the capacity of our 
construction, we now analyse the Clyde 
example. One has the standard normal 
defaults: Circus-Elephants are Royal-
Elephants, Royal-Elephants are Elephants, 
Elephants are Grey, Royal-Elephants are 
not Grey, Clyde is an Circus-Elephant. 
What colour is he (with or without the link 
Circus-Elephants are Elephants)? Figure 3 
presents the implementation of this problem 
in MacEvidence. It concludes that Clyde is 
not grey independently of the rule Circus­
Elephants are Elephants. Hone instantiates 
both InE and Clyde, the result is still Not 
Grey. 
7. Conclusions. 
We have developed two formulations that 
correspond respectively to two forms of 
normal defaults: :.A::>B/A:::>B and A:B/B. 
Both formulations can be implemented in 
MacEvidence, a programme that runs on 
Macintosh and computes belief functions 
for any network. The differences between 
the two formulations can be found in their 
behaviour in back propagations. Modus 
tollens applies to the first formulation, but 
not to the second. The choice between the 
two formulations must be based on the 
requirements that must be satisfied in a 
specific application. 
It is  worth mentioning that our 
formulations might break down if used 
blindly when trying to derive the solutions 
in binary logic, i.e. by using only 0 and 1 
weights. We shall now show that in fact 
the solutions found in binary logic are the 
limits of our solutions when the weights 
given to the 'typicality' variables tend to 1 .  
If we specify m(TB )= 1 in section 4, then 
by instantiating m(P)= 1, we get two strictly 
contradictory beliefs at the node TB: one 
comes from the prior m(TB)=l and the 
other from P which induces m(-,TB)=l. 
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Nevenheless, if we initiate the pTB and 
pTP such that m(TB)=x and m(TP)=y, 
then for all x<1 and y<1, m(B)=1 induces 
m(F)=x and m(P)=1 induces m( -,F')=y. So 
the limits for x and y approaching 1 are 
such that m(B )= 1 induces m(F)= 1 and 
m(P)= 1 induces m( -,F')= 1.  
Suppose that in our formulation for the 
standard normal defaults (see section 5), 
we give all the 'typicality' the weight 1. 
Deductions based on instantiations of InB, 
InP or InS are unaffected, except inasmuch 
as the deduced beliefs on F will have 
weights equal to 1. Problems appear, for 
instance, when both InB and -,F are 
instantiated, as the normalization phase of 
Dempster's rule of combination will not be 
possible at the F node. Nevertheless, for all 
values x = m(lnB::::>TB) < 1, one gets m(F) 
= x. Hence the limit of m(F) for x 
approaching 1 is also 1. 
Our two formulations handle both hard and 
weak exceptions. Suppose x is A and 
usually A implies B and x is an exception. 
With hard exceptions, the implication link 
A::::>B is blocked and we have -,B. With 
weak exceptions, only the implication link 
A::::>B is blocked. In Figures 1 and 2, we 
considered hard exceptions. To get weak 
exceptions, we simply remove the links 
S&TS::::>F, P&TP::::>-,F. 
Finally, the modularity of our formalisms 
is clear. Generalization is easy for other 
cases, e.g. the introduction of concepts 
such as 'strong wings' (in which case birds 
are more typical and the belief that they fly 
will be increased) or 'colibri' (in which 
case the non-typicality does not apply). The 
full power of the transferable belief model 
can be seen when the whole structure is 
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generalized through the use of belief 
functions more elaborate than those used 
here. Imagine that when I learn InB, I am 
not sure that B is true as the source that told 
me InB might be unreliable. Many other 
generalizations can be described in a similar 
manner. 
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